While Bayesian model selection is a useful tool to discriminate between competing cosmological models, it only gives a relative rather than an absolute measure of how good a model is. Bayesian doubt introduces an unknown benchmark model against which the known models are compared, thereby obtaining an absolute measure of model performance in a Bayesian framework.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important questions in cosmology is to identify the fundamental model underpinning the vast amount of observations nowadays available. The socalled "cosmological concordance model" is based on the cosmological principle (i.e., that the Universe is isotropic and homogeneous, at least on large enough scales) and on the hot Big Bang scenario, complemented by an inflationary epoch. This remarkably simple model is able to explain with only half a dozen free parameters observations spanning a huge range of time and length scales. Since both a cold dark matter (CDM) and a cosmological constant (Λ) component are required to fit the data, the concordance model is often referred to as "the ΛCDM model". It is however important to keep in mind that at this stage the ΛCDM model is not a model in the sense attributed to the word by particle physicists, but rather a phenomenological scenario that appears to be able to explain the vast majority of observations with a great economy of free parameters.
In the classical approach to statistics, models (or hypotheses) can never be proved true, only falsified. Popper (1959) , for example, argued that theories always remain "infinitely improbable" regardless of the amount of evidence gathered in their favour. However, in the context of Bayesian inference support can be accrued for a model if the observed data verify predictions made by the model but not by competing models (see Jaynes (2003) ). This is the subject of Bayesian model selection (see e.g. ; Trotta (2007) for applications to the cosmological context): given a set of competing models, the Bayes factor gives a measure of the relative performance of each model in explaining the data. This program naturally prefers models that provide a good fit with the fewest number of free parameters, thus implementing a quantitative version of Occam's razor.
Although Bayesian model selection can identify the best model in a given set of known models, it has no way of indicating whether the absolute quality of the preferred model is high or low. However, it seems desirable to be able to gauge the absolute performance of a model in a Bayesian sense, rather than just its relative performance with respect to known competitors. In particular, this seems crucial for deciding whether the set of known models includes the true model.
The purpose of this paper is to build on the notion of Bayesian doubt introduced by Starkman et al. (2008) to develop and apply a Bayesian technique for model discovery, focusing in particular on the nature of dark energy. The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we recall the notion of Bayesian doubt and introduce a new procedure for estimating an upper bound for the Bayes factor in favour of doubt. We next employ this procedure in section 3 to assess the state of our knowledge of the dark energy equation of state, focusing on the status of the current ΛCDM concordance model. We present our results in terms of the posterior probability c 0000 RAS for doubt and for ΛCDM in section 4 and discuss our conclusions in section 5.
BAYESIAN MODEL DISCOVERY
In this section we review the concept of Bayesian doubt and explain how this can lead to model discovery.
The notion of Bayesian doubt
Bayesian doubt, as introduced by Starkman et al. (2008) , is an extension of Bayesian model selection. It seeks to determine a scale quantifying the absolute quality of a model, as opposed to the relative performance of two models, given by their Bayes factor. The key idea of Bayesian doubt is that the general statistical characteristics of what would be recognised as a 'good' model are known, even if the specifics of the model are not.
We begin by introducing a hypothetical unknown model X which has the characteristics of what would be considered a good model, to be defined below. This idealized good model then acts as a benchmark against which known models can be compared using standard Bayesian model selection. Following Starkman et al. (2008) , we define 'doubt', D, as the posterior probability of this unknown model:
where {Mi} (i = 1, . . . , N ) is the set of N known models and d are the data. In the above expression, p(X) is the prior probability for the model X, in other words, the prior probability that our list of known models does not contain the true model. p(Mi) is the prior probability of model Mi and p(d|Mi) is the Bayesian evidence for model Mi, given by
where θi are the parameters of model Mi. p(d|θi, Mi) is the likelihood function for model Mi, and p(θi|Mi) is the prior probability of the parameters of model Mi. Once we have chosen the level of prior doubt by defining the value of p(X), based on a principle of indifference we assume for simplicity that the prior probabilities for the known N models are all equal, i.e.
We single out the ΛCDM model as one of the set of known models, and, looking ahead, refer to it as our baseline model. Therefore it is useful to rewrite Eq. (1) as
where we have introduced the Bayes factor
and the average Bayes factor between ΛCDM and each of the known models:
BjΛ.
(Note that the sum over models Mj includes j = Λ and therefore BiΛ 1/N .) Rather than looking at D directly, one can also consider the relative change in doubt R, given by the ratio of posterior to prior doubt:
A necessary condition for doubt to grow (R > 1) is
i.e., that the Bayes factor between model X and ΛCDM be much larger than the average Bayes factor between the known models and ΛCDM. However, for ΛCDM to be genuinely doubted it is not sufficient that R > 1. One has also to require that the probability for ΛCDM itself decreases, i.e., that p(Λ|d) < p(Λ). Applying again Bayes theorem, one finds that the ratio of the posterior probability for ΛCDM to its prior probability is given by
Hence to gather genuine doubt against ΛCDM we require that both conditions R > 1 and RΛ < 1 be fulfilled.
Upper bound on the evidence of the unknown model
In order to apply Bayesian doubt to the problem of cosmological model selection, it is necessary to estimate the evidence of the unknown model, p(d|X). The approach suggested by Starkman et al. (2008) was to calibrate the value of p(d|X) on simulated data sets from the best among the known models. This has been shown to lead to model discovery for a toy linear model. However, in the cosmological context it would be very computationally expensive to implement, even given fast algorithms to compute the evidence, such as MultiNest (Feroz et al. 2009) or the Savage-Dickey density ratio (Trotta 2007) . In this paper, we put forward a different, more economical approach, which aims at computing an absolute upper bound for p(d|X). Since our aim is to investigate the dark energy sector, in the following we focus on the dark energy equation of state, w(z). We cannot, of course, compute the evidence for X explicitly since its parameterization of w(z) is unspecified. Since the unknown model X is to provide a benchmark value for the evidence of the known models, it should be designed to provide a good fit to the available data, including cosmic microwave background (CMB), matter power spectrum (mpk) and supernovae type Ia (SNIa) observations. Therefore, the unknown model should have a high degree of flexibility. At the same time, we do not wish to incur the Occam's razor penalty coming from the high number of free parameters usually associated with a very flexible model. This is because we are seeking to build a phenomenological description for w(z) which, if model X is to be a 'good' model, should arise from an underlying, presently unknown theory with a small number of free parameters.
In order to have the advantages of a flexible (and therefore well-fitting) unknown model (i.e. low χ 2 /dof), without incurring a penalty for having a large number of free parameters, we define the evidence of the unknown model via the upper bound on the Bayes factor between the ΛCDM baseline model and a stand-in model with a very flexible w(z) (as specified in section 3.2 below). The absolute upper bound on the Bayes factor BXΛ between the unknown model X and ΛCDM (denoted by a subscript Λ) is given by (see Gordon & Trotta (2007) and references therein for details),
We have defined the best-fit chi-squared as minus 2 the log-likelihood at the best-fit point, θ * i :
where i = X, Λ. The bound of Eq. (10) arises by putting a posteriori the prior probability for the parameters of the standin model into a delta-function located at the observed maximum likelihood value, i.e. by replacing p(θX|MX ) in Eq. (2) with δ(θX − θ * X ). While this prior choice has no Bayesian justification (for it is inappropriate to use a posteriori information to determine the prior), it does lead to an absolute upper bound on the relative evidence between the baseline ΛCDM model and the unknown model. In order to calculate the absolute bound of Eq. (10), all that is needed is the difference between the best fit log-likelihood (or chi-squared) of the two models,
Λ , which can be easily computed. Since the ΛCDM model is nested within the unknown model (i.e., the unknown model reverts to ΛCDM for a specific choice of its parameters leading to w(z) = −1), it follows that ∆χ 2 0. Therefore it is clear that by construction BXΛ > 1 always, i.e., that our unknown model is always at least as good as ΛCDM.
By inspecting Eq. (10), one might be tempted to think that this upper bound on the Bayes factor merely translates in Bayesian terms the old goodness-of-fit χ 2 test. For if ΛCDM is a "bad" model (on whatever scale one wishes to define this), the value of χ 2 Λ will be large and thus the Bayes factor in favour of the unknown model will be large, as well. Thus one might think that Eq. (10) simply rephrases the well-known rule-of-thumb of χ 2 /dof ∼ 1. However, this is not the case, for the Table 1 . Empirical scale for evaluating the strength of evidence from the Bayes factor B ij between two models (socalled 'Jeffreys' scale'). The right-most column gives our convention for denoting the different levels of evidence above these thresholds, following Gordon & Trotta (2007) .
χ 2 /dof ∼ 1 rule only applies asymptotically (for n → ∞ number of data points) and only if the data points are independent, Gaussian distributed. Those conditions are almost invariably not met in the cosmological context. For instance, it is not even clear how one would define the concept of degrees of freedom for the CMB data, given that the C ℓ 's are not independent and are not Gaussian distributed. In the case of SNIa observations, the χ 2 /dof ∼ 1 criterion is satisfied for ΛCDM by construction, for the value of the intrinsic dispersion for the SNe is adjusted in such a way to require this to be the case, see e.g. Kowalski et al. (2008) . Therefore one cannot meaningfully use this kind of absolute goodness-of-fit tests on such a data set.
Instead, the upper bound given by Eq. (10) does not require any assumption about asymptotic behaviour, nor that the data are Gaussian distributed, nor independent. One only needs to be able to compute the log-likelihood at the best-fit point, including relevant correlations as necessary.
Finally, the upper bound of Eq. (10) could also be computed using the highest best-fit log-likelihood of all the known models, at no extra computational cost. This would give the absolute upper bound achievable among the class of known models. Although we do not pursue this approach in this paper, we recommend including in any Bayesian model comparison a model X with evidence obtained via this procedure, for this will give an estimate of the maximum possible level of doubt that can arise from the known models with their assigned priors.
Behaviour of doubt and posterior probability for ΛCDM
In the following, we will adopt the absolute upper bound BXΛ of Eq. (10) as an estimator for the Bayes factor of the unknown model X, and explore the consequence in terms of doubt and in terms of the posterior probability for ΛCDM. It is clear from Eqs. (4) and (9) that for a given level of prior doubt p(X), the posterior models' probabilities are controlled uniquely by the two quantities BiΛ and BXΛ. The result can be expected to fall within one of the three scenarios below, which we will examine from two points of view: using doubt D and using the upper bound to the Bayes factor BXΛ as measures of doubt. While there is something to be said for employing BXΛ (whose value can be translated into a strength of evidence via the Jeffreys' scale, given in Table 1 ) as a criterion for goodness of fit, it turns out that doubt can shed some light onto how large BXΛ should be to have genuine doubt without referring to the (in some sense arbitrary calibrated) Jeffreys' scale.
• Case 1: BXΛ ≫ 1 and BiΛ ∼ 1: in this case, the unknown model has a much better evidence than ΛCDM, which in turn has about the same evidence as the other known models. As the Bayes factor BXΛ > 1, we should expect there to be a significant amount of doubt, D ≈ 1. And indeed, from Eq. (1) the doubt is, assuming p(X) ≪ 1:
for p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1. In other words, we are inclined to believe that there is a better model that we have not yet thought of if the Bayes factor between the unknown model and ΛCDM is sufficiently large to override the smallness of the prior doubt, BXΛ > 1/p(X) (notice the independence of the Jeffreys' scale). The change in the probability for ΛCDM itself is given by, from Eq. (9),
While the doubt grows (D → 1) the probability for ΛCDM declines, RΛ ≪ 1. In this case, one is led to genuinely doubt ΛCDM.
• Case 2: BXΛ ≫ 1 and BiΛ ≪ 1(i = Λ): in this case, ΛCDM is clearly the best of the known models, as the Bayes factors between the known models and ΛCDM are all small. Again, as the Bayes factor BXΛ ≫ 1 favors the unknown model, we should be doubting our list of models. As BiΛ ≈ 1/N , we find
for p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1/N . This seems to contradict the result of Case 1. However, as we noted above, the condition that D ≈ 1 is only necessary but not sufficient for doubt to arise. We need to examine the relative change in probability for ΛCDM which is given by
Requiring RΛ < 1 leads to the stronger condition p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1, as in Case 1 above. If the latter condition is not fulfilled, doubt will grow at the expenses of the probability of the other known models, as the prior probability mass which was spread among the N known models according to Eq. (3) gets redistributed between X and ΛCDM.
• Case 3: BXΛ ∼ 1: in this case, the upper bound on the Bayes factor between the unknown model and ΛCDM is of order unity. This means that we should have no reason to doubt our set of models. The expression for doubt Eq. (1) simplifies to
In order to reach a high level of doubt D ≈ 1, we would need BiΛ /p(X) ≈ 0. Clearly, this is only the case if we allow for p(X) ≫ BiΛ 1/N , i.e. if we are starting off with a prior doubt which is larger than the indifference prior on the known models, which is usually not the case. Otherwise, if the Bayes factor BXΛ is larger than the prior doubt p(X), we can regard our list of models as reasonably complete, and perform Bayesian model comparison among the list of known models. Of course, this procedure must be repeated once new data arrives (see Starkman et al. (2009) for the procedure that this entails). Note that again we do not need to refer to the Jeffreys' scale, but need to compare the average Bayes factor BiΛ with our prior doubt p(X).
In summary, we are led to doubt the current baseline ΛCDM model only if the rule of thumb
is satisfied, which corresponds to either Case 1 above or to Case 2 when the condition for RΛ < 1 is also fulfilled. If Eq. (17) is satisfied, we are guaranteed that doubt will grow and at the same time the probability for the ΛCDM model will decrease, thus signaling the opportunity for model discovery. All this is accomplished without referring to Jeffreys' scale.
APPLICATION OF DOUBT TO THE DARK ENERGY EQUATION OF STATE

The known models
We take the flat ΛCDM model as our baseline model, described by the usual 6-parameters set θ = {As, nS, ω b , ωc, ΩΛ, H0}, where As is the amplitude of scalar fluctuations, nS is the spectral index, ω b the physical baryon density, ωc the cold dark matter density, ΩΛ the density parameter for the cosmological constant and H0 the Hubble constant today. We assume purely adiabatic fluctuations throughout this paper. We define the other models in the known models list by increasing the complexity of the baseline model in successive steps. First, we only add a non-zero curvature parameter, Ωκ = 0, with a flat prior in the range −0.3 Ωκ 0.3, akin to the "Astronomer's prior" adopted and justified in Vardanyan et al. (2009) . Alternatively, another model is obtained by only adding an effective equation of state parameter for dark energy, w = −1, with a flat prior in the range −1.3 w −0.7 while keeping Ωκ = 0 fixed. Finally, a fourth model with 8 free parameters is obtained by adding both Ωκ = 0 and w = −1 with the above priors to the ΛCDM baseline model.
One could in principle further increase the complexity of the known models, e.g. by adopting more complex descriptions for w(z), such as the so-called CPL parameterization in terms of the parameters (w0, wa). However, those models have in general a lower evidence than ΛCDM, as they are penalized for their wasted parameter space, see e.g. Liddle et al. (2006b) . As a conse-quence, they are expected not to contribute significantly to BiΛ , and therefore their influence on posterior doubt would be minor, see section 4.2 for details. One could also add to the list alternative explanations for the apparent acceleration of the Universe, such as for example modified gravity models, provided one can compute their evidence numerically (Heavens et al. 2007) . As the main goal of this paper is to introduce the methodology related to Bayesian doubt, we however restrict our considerations to the four models listed above. We comment in section 4.2 on how our results would change if the list of known models would be further enlarged.
Finally, in this work we do not address the problem of the fine tuning of the value of the cosmological constant itself. All models we consider here suffer equally from the fine tuning problem, i.e., the fact that the measured value of the cosmological constant is some 120 orders of magnitude smaller than the "natural" scale set by the Planck mass if Λ arises from quantum fluctuations of the vacuum. Anthropic reasoning in the context of the Multiverse has been invoked to explain the smallness of the cosmological constant, and while Bayesian reasoning could be brought to bear on the effectiveness of such an "explanation", we shall not consider this aspect further in the present paper.
Parameterization of the unknown model
Our discussion so far has been completely general, sidestepping the crucial issue of how to evaluate Eq. (10) for the unknown model. In order to make further progress, we have to make some assumptions regarding the class of alternative models the unknown model X is supposed to come from.
As we are interested in the dark energy sector, we will assume that the phenomenology of model X is such that it only leads to modifications to the right-handside of Einstein equations. In other words, we do not investigate models that modify General Relativity except for those whose only impact is a change in the effective energy-momentum tensor. Under this assumption, a model X is fully specified once we give its redshiftdependent equation of state of dark energy w(z). Notice that we also implicitly assume that the Universe is well described by a FRW isotropic cosmology. If one wished to include a more general class of alternative models from which to draw X, one could do so by parameterizing their phenomenology in a suitable way. One could define even more general classes of alternative models, for example by fitting parameterized functions to the observations. However, we do not pursue this approach here, because such a modeling of the data would be devoid of any physical insight and would achieve a purely descriptive fit to the observations. To see why this is not desirable, one only has to push this approach to its extreme consequences: given any data collection, there is always a "model" that fits the data perfectly. This model is obtained by simply choosing the value of the "theory" to be identical to the observed value for each of the observations. Of course, nobody would ever consider such a model to be a valid scientific theory, because we demand that the latter should have explanatory power, not be a simple description of the data. Therefore, it seems sensible to require from the outset that our unknown model X be part of a class of physical theories, with phenomenological parameters that are linked with the physical framework of the class of models considered (here, FRW isotropic Universes with time-varying dark energy equation of state and otherwise standard cosmology).
Therefore we are left with the task of parameterizing w(z) as a function of redshift, and then use its functional form to compute the ∆χ 2 between the unknown model and the ΛCDM baseline model. To this purpose, we employ the Parameterized Post Friedman (PPF) prescription developed by Hu & Sawicki (2007) ; Hu (2008) . The PPF prescription was originally introduced to describe the behavior of theories of modified gravity in a metric framework that describes leading order deviations from general relativity (subject to certain assumptions). However, it was also found be well-suited for describing the evolution of dark energy models that cross the so-called "phantom divide", w = −1. Crossing this phantom divide in models with fixed sound speed would lead to divergences in the pressure perturbations. Hence models that are phenomenologically described by a time-varying w(z) that crosses w = −1 must be described micro-physically by a theory of scalar-fields with a varying speed of sound, e.g. DGP-type models.
Numerical implementation and data sets
Below, we investigate the behaviour of doubt for different combinations of cosmological data sets. In particular, we are interested in studying doubt as the constraining power of the combined data increases.
We modified the CosmoMC (Lewis & Bridle 2002)) parameter estimation package to sample the additional parameters wi ≡ w(zi), where zi are uniformly spaced at n = 10 redshift value, ranging from z = 0 . . . 1.5. Fang et al. (2008a,b) wrote a plugin to CAMB (Lewis et al. 2000) that implements the PPF prescription and is freely available for download 1 , which we adopted for this work. The PPF module uses cubic splines to interpolate w between these points, and assumes w(z > 1.5) ≡ w(z = 1.5).
We adopted the 307 SNe Ia from the "Union" data set compiled by Kowalski et al. (2008) . The CMB data and likelihood used was the WMAP five year data set (Dunkley et al. 2009 ). Tegmark et al. (2006) provided the data and likelihood code for the matter power spectrum using SDSS DR4. The evidence for the known models is computed using the publicly available MultiNest code (Feroz & Hobson 2008; Feroz et al. 2009; , which implements the nested sampling algorithm, employed as an add-in sampler to CosmoMC (Lewis & Bridle 2002) and CAMB (Lewis et al. 2000) .
The gist of nested sampling is that the multidimensional evidence integral of Eq. (2) is recast into a one-dimensional integral. This is accomplished by defining the prior volume x as dx ≡ p(θ)dθ so that
where the integral is over the parameter space enclosed by the iso-likelihood contour L(θ) = λ. So x(λ) gives the volume of parameter space above a certain level λ of the likelihood. Then the Bayesian evidence, Eq. (2), can be written as
where L(x) is the inverse of Eq. (18). Samples from L(X) can be obtained by drawing uniformly samples from the likelihood volume within the iso-contour surface defined by λ. The 1-dimensional integral of Eq. (19) can be obtained by simple quadrature, thus
where the weights are Wi = 1 2
(xi−1 − xi+1). The standard deviation on the value of the log-evidence can be estimated as (H/n live ) 1/2 , where H is the negative relative entropy and n live is the number of live points adopted, which in our case is n live = 4000 (see Feroz & Hobson (2008) for details).
The best-fit χ 2 required to evaluate Eq. (10) is obtained by performing a Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) reconstruction of the posterior of the 16 parameters model comprising the ΛCDM parameters θ and the above 10-parameters description of w(z). We gather a total of 5 × 10 5 samples in 8 parallel chains and verify that the Gelman & Rubin mixing criterion (Gelman & Rubin 1992) is satisfied (i.e., R ≪ 0.1, where R is the inter-chain variance divided by the intra-chain variance).
MCMC is rather geared towards exploring the bulk of the posterior probability density, and is not particularly optimised to look for the absolute best-fit value. This is especially true for high dimensional parameter spaces. Therefore, we expect that the best-fit χ 2 values recovered via MCMC for the 16-dimensional model X are going to be systematically higher than the true bestfit. In order to estimate and correct for this numerical bias, we sampled via MCMC a 16 dimensional Gaussian of unit variance, recovered the best-fit χ 2 and compared it with the true best-fit value, repeating the procedure 5000 times. This gives an estimate of the numerical bias, under the assumption (which is valid locally) that the posterior distribution of model X is close to Gaussian in the immediate vicinity of the best-fit. We found that the MCMC systematically overestimates the best-fit χ 2 value by 0.94 ± 0.14, and therefore subtracted this estimate from the recovered χ 2 best-fit value for model X. We also verified that the numerical bias in recovering the best-fit χ 2 for a 6-dimensional parameter space (such as ΛCDM) is negligible in comparison.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We now proceed to evaluate the doubt and the posterior probability of ΛCDM for various combinations of cosmological data sets.
Model comparison outcome including doubt
In Table 2 , we present the estimated upper limit on the Bayes factor between ΛCDM and model X as well as the Bayes factors with respect to ΛCDM for the other known models. Among the known models, we confirm what many others have shown -that ΛCDM is the best-fit known model, or at least that no other model is demonstrably better. Thus, we find an inconclusive model comparison result (according to the Jeffreys' scale, Table 1 ) when comparing ΛCDM and a model with a free (but constant) w. We also find weak to moderate evidence (1 ∼ < ln B ∼ < 2.5) against spatially curved models when compared to a flat ΛCDM, in agreement with the more detailed findings of Vardanyan et al. (2009) . Finally, there is weak to moderate evidence against the most complex of the known models -one exhibiting both w = −1 and Ωκ = 0. This is in good agreement with the results of previous more thorough analyses, e.g. Liddle et al. (2006a,b) and Li et al. (2009) . From this, ordinary Bayesian model comparison concludes that ΛCDM is still the best of the known models (at least for the limited range of alternative models considered here).
Most importantly, in the table, we report the improvement in the best-fit log-likelihood obtained over ΛCDM by using X, and use this to compute an absolute upper bound to the Bayes factor via Eq. (10). We notice that the improvement in the best-fit is fairly modest for all the data sets considered, supportive of the general sentiment in the community that ΛCDM is in good agreement with available observations and that therefore there is little room for statistical improvement of the quality of fit. This is in part because it is very hard to improve the quality of fit by changing w(z) -observables are usually a double integral of w(z), and therefore insensitive to features in the equation of state (see e.g Huterer & Turner (1999) ; Maor et al. (2001) and Clarkson (2009) ). As a consequence, even a highly flexible w(z) model such as the one we used here to describe X will lead to only small observable departures from the standard cosmological constant scenario. It is important to keep in mind that such statements depend strongly on the statistics one employs to examine the models. For example, the standard likelihood function for CMB Table 2 . In the first three columns, we report the Bayes factors between the known models and ΛCDM for different combinations of data sets, where ln B jΛ < 0 favours ΛCDM. The fourth columns gives ∆χ 2 = χ 2 X − χ 2 Λ , the improvement in the best-fit loglikelihood obtained by using model X (specified in the text) over ΛCDM. The last column gives the corresponding absolute upper bound to the Bayes factor between model X and ΛCDM.
data is insensitive to most of the reported anomalies in the low-ℓ CMB Copi et al. (2010) ; Bennett et al. (2010) .
The interesting consequence from the point of view of doubt is that this translates into strong upper limits for the Bayes factor between model X and ΛCDM (third from last column of Table 2 ). We find that the upper limit on the Bayes factor BXΛ (last column of Table 2 ) for all the data combinations is less than 3, just around "weak evidence" threshold (ln B = 1, see Table 1 ). From our discussion in section 2.2, this means that the necessary condition for doubt to grow, p(X)BXΛ ≫ 1, is not met for any reasonable doubt prior choice. We remind the reader at this point that our unknown model X has been designed in such a way as to exhibit the maximum possible evidence against ΛCDM. Therefore, if even such a model cannot achieve a significant level of evidence against ΛCDM, one can safely conclude that no other reasonable model will. Of course this conclusion depends both on the set of observations we have considered and on the particular likelihood function we have ascribed to that data. New statistical treatments can bring to light anomalies in the existing data, while new observations might contain new unexpected features.
Our results in terms of posterior probability for doubt and for the ΛCDM model are shown in Table 3 , for two different assumptions regarding the level of prior doubt, p(X) = 10 −2 and p(X) = 10 −6 . These two choices are representative of a range that we think might bracket reasonable prior expectations: a prior doubt of 1% is certainly not too large, while leaving a little space for updating our models beliefs in the light of data. A prior doubt of 10 −6 reflects the fact that surely we have to allow for a one-in-a-million chance that our current list of known models might be incomplete, and that the true underlying dark energy model might still be undiscovered. Table 3 contains the level of doubt, which is updated from the prior by using the results of Table 2 for the models' evidences. We find an increase in doubt by a factor of ∼ 6 for the most constraining data combination (CMB+SN+mpk). This however is largely a consequence of the doubt model acquiring some of the probability mass of the known models other than ΛCDM, as discussed under Case 3 in section 2.2. Indeed, the posterior probability of ΛCDM is observed to increase (last col- Combination of data sets Posterior probability ΛCDM 50% probability Doubt (unknown model X) Figure 1 . Posterior probability for doubt for the ΛCDM model as a function of different combinations of data sets. The probability of ΛCDM increases from the initial 25% to just about over 50%, while the probability of doubt increases from the initial 1% to just over 6%, mostly as a consequence of acquiring probability from the other 3 known models considered in the analysis. This signals that ΛCDM remains the most valid statistical description of the data. umn of Table 3 ), from the initial prior value p(Λ) ≈ 0.25 to just over 50% for the most constraining data combination. This result is almost independent of the choice of prior doubt. The behaviour of the posterior probability for doubt and ΛCDM for a prior choice p(X) = 10 −2 is shown in Fig. 1 , as a function of the data sets employed.
Prior doubt: p(X) = 10 −6 (with p(X) = 10 −2 and p(Λ) ≈ 0.25) CMB only (2.50 ± 0.2) × 10 −2 (2.54 ± 0.2) × 10 −6 0.34 ± 0.01 CMB+SN (5.69 ± 0.5) × 10 −2 (5.97 ± 0.6) × 10 −6 0.44 ± 0.01 CMB+mpk (3.46 ± 0.3) × 10 −2 (3.54 ± 0.4) × 10 −6 0.55 ± 0.02 CMB+SN+mpk (6.29 ± 0.8) × 10 −2 (6.64 ± 0.9) × 10 −6 0.53 ± 0.02 Table 3 . First two columns: Posterior doubt for different data sets combinations and two prior doubt assumptions. Last column: posterior probability for the ΛCDM model when allowing for the possibility of a 1% prior doubt on the completeness of our list of known models. Table 4 . Improvement in the χ 2 of ΛCDM required for the unknown model X to have the same a posteriori probability as ΛCDM. First two columns: as a function of the number of known models, N , assuming a fixed prior doubt p(X) = 10 −2 . Last two columns: assuming a fixed fractional prior doubt, p(X) = p(Λ)/f , and as a function of f . It is assumed that the evidence of the known models is much smaller than the evidence for ΛCDM.
Known models
Impact of the addition of further known models
We now proceed to estimate the robustness of our findings with respect to expanding the set of known models. As has been mentioned above, the list of three alternative known models to ΛCDM we adopted in this work is far from complete. However, even if a larger number of models N were included in the known models list, it is reasonable to assume that the value of the average evidence between the known models and ΛCDM would scale approximately as ∝ 1/N , for there is no other known model that presently can achieve a substantially higher evidence than ΛCDM (if this was the case, then this other best model would take the place of ΛCDM and become our baseline model which we seek to doubt -or rather the dominant model in our list of models where we intend to compute the doubt for the whole list). By equating Eqs. (4) and (9) we can solve for the value of ∆χ 2 required for the posterior on doubt to be equal to the posterior of ΛCDM. This gives the approximate condition (assuming that BiΛ ≈ 1/N and that p(X) ≪ 1):
So the value of ∆χ 2 required for posterior doubt to reach the posterior for ΛCDM scales logarithmically with the number of known models. Assuming a prior doubt p(X) = 10 −2 one obtains the values of ∆χ 2 listed in the first column of Table 4 as a function of N . As more known doubts are put on the table, it becomes easier to doubt ΛCDM. From this scaling, it would appear that the improvement of ∆χ 2 = −2.3 for model X reported in Table 2 for the data combination cmb+SN would lead to a larger probability of doubt than for ΛCDM if we had assumed a list of N ∼ > 30 known models, rather than just three. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , this effect is however a consequence of our choice of spreading the level of prior probabilities among the N known models, while assuming a fixed p(X), see Eq. (3). As N increases, the prior for ΛCDM decreases while the prior doubt is kept constant. As a consequence, it becomes easier for the former to "catch up" with the latter.
In order to avoid this spurious effect, one could choose to set the prior doubt as a fraction 1/f (f > 1) of the prior probability for ΛCDM, i.e., to require that the relative probability between X and Λ is constant a priori, independent of the number of known models. We thus replace the prescription of Eq. (3) by
and by equating the posterior doubt with the posterior for ΛCDM we obtain the following requirement for the ∆χ 2 :
This is now independent of the number of known models N and it only depends logarithmically on the prior doubt fraction, f . From the last two columns of Table 4 we can see that even if doubt started off a factor of just f = 4 less probable than ΛCDM, a ∆χ 2 = −5.5 would be required in order for the unknown model X to become as probable as ΛCDM. Increasing the prior gap between doubt and ΛCDM (i.e., increasing f ) only makes the requirements on the χ 2 improvement more taxing. In summary, once the effect of adding extra models to the known models' list is corrected for by introducing the fractional prior doubt f , we find that the improvement in the χ 2 found for various combinations of data sets is insufficient to doubt ΛCDM. If the unknown model starts off being a factor of 4 less probable than ΛCDM, one would need an improvement in the χ 2 of about 5 units to reverse the situation in the posterior, which is quite a bit larger than the maximum χ 2 improvement observed from the data.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to extend the application of Bayesian model selection to define an absolute scale of goodness of fit for models, rather than just a relative one, such as the Jeffreys' scale. We showed how the notion of doubt can be used to evaluate the evidence in favour of a missing 'ideal' unknown model in the list of known cosmological models. We demonstrated how a useful absolute upper bound to the Bayesian evidence of an unknown model can be derived and how this can be implemented in the context of Bayesian model comparison.
Doubt can be incorporated in the framework of model comparison to help us decide whether our currently "best" model is statistically adequate for the data at hand. Kunz et al. (2006) introduced the notion of Bayesian complexity to decide whether the available models are over-complex with respect to the constraining power of the data. Bayesian doubt can act as a useful complement to Bayesian complexity, giving an indication of whether the current models are statistically insufficiently to describe the data. Used in conjunction, doubt and complexity can thus extend the power and domain of applicability of Bayesian model comparison. Of course statistical considerations should never replace proper physical insight: all of our arguments are restricted to the statistical aspects of data modeling. But for the problem of dark energy, where most "models" are of a phenomenological kind, it seems to us that a rigorous statistical framework can help deciding whether new theoretical explorations might be fruitful. Other domains where we expect doubt to be useful include the description of the spectral distribution of CMB anisotropies and the problem of anomalous alignments between multipoles in the CMB (Tegmark et al. 2003; Schwarz et al. 2004; Land & Magueijo 2005) .
We have applied this methodology to the problem of dark energy, adopting a list of known models including possible extensions of the dark energy sector and non-zero curvature of the Universe. In principle, many more models could be added to the list of known models. However we argued that our results are robust against adding further models to the list of known models. We found that current CMB, matter power spectrum and SNIa data do not require the introduction of an alternative model to the baseline flat ΛCDM model. The upper bound of the Bayesian evidence for a presently unknown dark energy model against ΛCDM gives only weak evidence in favour of the unknown model. Since this is an absolute upper bound, we conclude that ΛCDM remains a sufficient phenomenological description of currently available observations.
